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Agricultural Policie
This  paper  - a  product  of  the  Agricultural  Policies  Division,  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development
Department  - is part  of  a  larger  effort  in PRE  to  provide  analytical  reviews  of  major  issues  in the
sustainability  of natural  resources  and prescrvation  of environmental  quality.  Copies  are available  free
from the World Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington  DC 20433.  Please contact  Cicely  Spooner,  room
N8-035,  extension  30464  (32 pages).
Until  1976, Bank  policy  emphasized  recovery  of  *  Acccpt  the  diversity  of wultures and institu-
all costs on irrigation  projects,  or  at least  com-  tional arrangements  in borrowing  countries  and
plete  recovery  of operating  and maintenance  incorporate  flexibility  and  ingenuity  into the
(O&M)  costs.  Subsequently,  policy  specified  design  of feasible  irrigation  institutions.
three  pricing  objectives  for the design  of irriga-
tion service  fees:  economic  efficiency,  income  *  Focus the  Bank  dialogue  on the physical
distribution,  and  public  savings.  sustainability  of irrigation  investments  and
associated  natural  resourecs.  In short,  the Bank
The objective  of economic  efficiency  was  should  be more flexible  about  institutional
framed  in irrelevant  terms  and the  detailed  preferences  but should  insist  more  strongly  on
objectives  for income  distribution  wcre  unwork-  arrangements  that preserve  sustainability.
able.  This  left the objective  of public  savings  -
for which  there  are no clearcut  instructions.  *  Approach  the  financing  of irrigation  as a
policy  adjustment  issue.
So betwcen  1976 and  1988 no effective
formal  policy  guidelines  existed  for cost  recov-  *  Base  cost-recovery  policy  on an analysis  of
ery on irrigation  - although  the  Bank  was  the total complex  of government  interventions.
active  in lending  for irrigation  in those  12 years.  Most  countries  prefer  to impose  direct  and
indirect  taxes on agricultural  commodity  output
No OED review  of loan conditionality  on  although  such  taxes  are often unjustified  in
cost recovery  for irrigation  has  been produced  terms of equity  or cost  recovery.
for the  period,  but the  1986 OED review  on the
period  before  1976 concluded  tha  thie record  for  Decisions  on the third  and fourth  points
the earlier  period  was not good.  require  thorough  economic  analysis.
In at Ieast two-thirds  of  the projects  re-  * Assign  tax policy  instruments  to appropriate
viewed,  the covenant  requiring  cost  recovery  to  policy  objectives.
cover  at least  O&M costs  had not been  honored.
In many  cases,  the covenants  covering  cost  *  Accept  indirect  cost  recovery  where  it
recovery  were  so vague  that it was difficult  to  exists,  but insist  on an accounting  of the equity
judge  if there had  been compliance.  Auditors  issues associated  with rent transfers  for irriga-
found  O&M  of the irrigation  satisfactory  in only  tion.
half of the  projects.
On the fifth  and sixth  points,  analysis  must
Existing  guidelines  are  inadequate,  and  the  take into account  the welfare  effects  on the
need  for quality  control  is great,  so O'Mara  major  groups  involved.  The  appropriate  objec-
proposes  six points  as the basis  for a new policy  tive for irrigation  serviec  fees (if  there  are no
framework  for Bank  irrigation  projects:  equity  issues)  is public  savings  or  cost recovery.
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This  paper  Is  about  sustalnabillity  of  irrigation  Investments  In both  the  financial
and  physical  senses.  Clearly  the  two  senses  are  closely  related,  almost like  difference
sides of  the  same coin.  Finance provides  the  clalm on  resources  necessary  to  accomplish
physical  operations  In an  economic system,  while physical  operatlons  provide  a  flow  of
services  for  which beneficiaries  are  willing to  pay  In terms  of  clalme on  resources  (i.e.,
money).  Thus  stated,  the  matter  seems only  to  require  that  private  agents  organize  a
market.  The difficulty  Is that  Irrigation  Is almost never  organized  as  a market  for  water.
The reasons  for  this  situation  will now be  sketched.
The use  of  man-made structures  to  alter  the  temporal  and spatial  distribution  of
water  provided  by the  natural  hydrological  cycle  goes  back  thousands  of  years.  Yet  the
economic, political  and  legal  Issues  associated  with  Irrigation  remain sources  of  conflict
to  this  very  day.  Some socIetles  regard  the  water  from  the  hydrological  cycle  as a God-
given  commodity  and  object  to  arrangements  which  require  payment  fok  access  to
Irrigation  (for  a revlew of  water  law systems,  see  Radosevich (1988)).  Moreover,  mother
nature  can  be  capricious  In her  distributlon  over  tlme  of  rain  and  snow  fall;  and  the
bounty  from  nature  tends  to  create  Its  own pattern  of  distribution  In the  absence  of
human Intervention.
The natural  patterns  of  distrlbution  are often  taken  as given  by legal  systems  in
assigning  property  rights  to  water.  Thus, the  riparian rights  legal doctrine  assigns  rights
of  use  to  property  owners  whose land touches  uprn  a stream,  river,  or  lake created  by
natural  drainage  flows.  When demand for  use  tends  to  exceed  supply  (in  years  of  low
flows)  along parts  of  a natu~ral  dralnage  system, the  historical  rights  legal  doctrine  often
supersedes  In an offaDrt  to  establish  woll defined  legal rights.  However, this  precedent-- 2 -
based criterIon--"first  In time, first  In right"--puts  latecomers  In a disadvantaged  position
and thus proviles  an Incentive for  promotlon of  investments that will Increase the rate
of  capture of  naturally occurrlng flows as well as facilitating their distribution over  time.
Slnce water rights are problematic  in the absence of  clear legal definition and effective
enforcement, the supply available  to any user depends  on the actlons of other users and
potential  users.  This physical linkage between users makes It  difficult  to  finance and
organize Irrigation Investments  privately, except In the case of  tubewells  abstracting from
groundwater where land owners face no significant legal restralnts  and smallscale  surface
Irrigation where several  landowners each Invest  together.  For  a  discussion of  the
economic effects  of  physical llnkages between irrigating farmers, see O'Mara  (1988).  In
simple consequence, irrigation  supply comes overwhelmingly  from Investments by  some
branch of  government, even in countries such as the US  where custom strongly  prefers
private  sector  development.
When  the  stage of  significant pubilc sector  Investments Is reached, the  natural
pattern  of  drainage Is changed,  and the allocation of  water supply Inevitably becomes  a
matter of  public policy.  Note, however,  that distributlon Is constralned by topography and
the  large Increase In cost  that occurs  when water must be pumped  uphill.  Despite this
constraint,  the Introduction of  surface  Irrigation to  an arid or semi-arid region creates
a production potential that  Is very Idrge In relation to  previous productlon.  The value
of  this  potentlal  production  when realized minus the  social  opportunity  costs  of  all
nonwater Inputs defines the rent  that  Is available to be distributed vla public pollcy.  To
the extent that  pollcy permits access to  Irrigation water at a price less than Its marginal
value  in  agricultural  production,  the  Irrigation rent  Is  captured  by  land owners and
ultimately capitalized  Into land values. Thus,  charges for Irrigation services inevitably have- 3-.
strong  distributVonal Implications; and  the  determination of  such  charges  Is  almost
Invariably subJect to  a political process.  For example,  a political leadership that  assigns
large Irrigation rents to a favored group of land owners may  create a powerful supportive
constituency  that  will ensure  political  control  over  many years.  The introductlon  of
su.-face Irrigation to more humid  regions as a supplement  to rainfed flows is similar  except
that  the Irrigation rent  will be smaller  per unit  of  land.
Given that  Irrigatlon supply comes largely  from public sector  Investments, the
related Issues of  financlal and physical  sustainability of  supply tend naturally to be linked
to the revenue and expenditure sides of  government  operations.  That Is, ultimately these
Issues are determined by the political processes that  shape t,  v Institutional content of
government operations.  One Institutional  possibility  Is  alr 'st  complete autonomy for
Irrigation system operatlons In both the financial and operational senses, permitting an
Irrigation  organization  highly specialized to  Its  function  In  terms  of  administration,
personnel, technology, operations and Investment planning.  Another possibility  Is the
almost  complete  submersion  of  irrigation finance and operations wlthin  general government.
The institutlonal  options  have significant  impilcations for  the  efficlency  of  Irrigation
operations, and a strong  case can be made for  a more specialized, quasi-autonomous
organizatlon.  However, in  this  paper  the  ultimate right  of  governments to  choose
preferred  Institutional  forms  Is  accepted;  and the  focus  Is  on  sustainability in  both
senses.
In the next section, two polar models  of  irrigatlon finance are discussed, followed
by a discussion  of  quality control In Irrigation and reviews of World  Bank Irrigation pricing
policy,  irrigation  cost  recovery  and operations  and malntenance  funding conditionality
experience and a  discusslon of  some reasons for  noncompliance  witth Bank Irrigatlonlending  conditionality.  Then  a  framework  for  the  design  of  sustainable  irrigatlon
Investments  Is  presented  and  a summinary  of  results  and recommendatlons Is  given.
IL  MODELS  OF RRIGATION  FINANCE
Analytical  characterizations  of  irrigation  finance  tend  to  conform  to  tne  of  two
polar  types:  1) the  fiscal  autonomy model, and 2) the  fiscal  dependence  model.  The former
emphasizes efficient  deilvery  of  a well-defined  Irrigation  service,  and the  latter  looks  at
irrlgation  as  only  one  among many governmental  activities  directed  toward  agriculture.
The Fiscal  Autonomy Model
This model consciously  seeks  the  anaiogy of  Irrigation  finance  with the  speclalized
finance  of  services  such  as  electricity  or  telecommunications.  It  envision;  a  quasi-
autonomous  oig anizatlon  which supplies  clearly  specifled  Irrigation  s6rvices  to  a clientele
of  Irrigating  farmers  In  a  river  basin  or  similar  natural  irrlgation  unit.  The  Irrigation
organization  controls  Investment,  operations  and  maintenance decisions,  assesses  and
collects  Irrigation  service  fees,  and  arranges  iong-term  finance  by  issulng  bonds.
Irrlgatlon  service  fees  are  set  such  that  they  cover  costs.  Intrinslc  to  the  effective  and
reliable  functloning  of  this  model  Is  an  institutional  context  that  enforces  pubilc
accountability  of  the  irrlgation  system  management.  This requirement  must Include public
reporting  of  operations,  maintenance,  finance  and  Investment  activities  (much  In  the
manner of  the  reporting  required  of  a private  sector  corporation  In the  U.S.) and  annual
audit  by  an  Independent  auditor.  It  should  provide  for  farmer  and  finance  ministry
representation  on  a  revlew  board  that  must  approve  budgets  and  Investments.  If
government  wlshes  to  subsidize  irrigating  farmers,  then  the  subsidies  are  pald  to  theIrrigation  organizatlon  In return  for  setting  f*es  at  a  level  that  Is  less  than  cost.  In
principle,  the  Irrigation  organization  has an  Incentive  to  provide  services  efficlently  (if  It
Is diligently  monitored)  and should provide  no more or  less  service  than  farmers  are willing
to  pay  for.  In practice,  once  subsidy  Is  admitted,  the  simple efficlency  clakns for  the
fiscal  autonomy  model no  kbnger  hold.  In addition,  once  sustained  operation  comes to
depend  on  subsidy,  It  Is  very  likely  that  tne  Irrigatlon  organizatin  will no  longer  be  as
responsive  to  farmer  demands.
The Flscal  Dependence Model
This model views  governments  as  Irresistibly  drawn to  Intervene  In agriculture  by
means of  taxes  or  subsidles  on  the  prices  of  outputs  and Inputs,  by means of  Investment
In Infrastructure,  research  and extension,  and by  means of  services  such  as  Irrigation,
pest  control,  marketing  of  outputs  and  Inputs,  commodlty Inspection  and grading.  From
this  perspective,  the provislon  and pricing of  Irrigatlon  services  Is shiply  one  among many
Interventions  by  government,  and  b<.th  efficiency  and  eoqulty concerns  require  the
consistency  of  Irrigatlon  policy  wlth  the  other  governmental  Interventlons  In agricuittA.  e.
The  fiscal  dependence  model  finds  no  speclal  merit  In  either  fInancia.  or  operational
autonomy.  Irrigation  ravenues  are  collected  In the  same fashion  as  any  other  tax,  and
Irrigation  Investments,  operations  and  maintenance are  part  of  the  general  governinent
budget  and  subjected  to  the  same fiscal  scrutiny.  Thus,  routine  maintenance  of  an
Irrigation  system must  promise marginal returns  equal to  the  marginal cost  of  government
revenue  even In times of  fiscal  stringency  If It Is to  be fully  funded  on  a sustained  basib.
It  also  follows  that  there  Is  no  necessary  connection  between  payment  of  Irrigation
service  fees  and  the  financing  of  Irrigation  Investments,  operations  and  maIntenance.
Moreover,  the  information  and  high level  management requirements  for  determination  ofconsistent,  officient  and  equitable  pollcles  toward  agriculture  are  Increased  by  at  least
an order  of  magnitude.  In consequence,  many developing country  governments  are unable
to  generate  polclies  toward  agriculture  that  are  consistent,  efficlent  and  equltable.
IIL  THE  GROWM  CONCERN  OVER  QUALITY  CONTROL  IN RRIGATION
CONSTRUCTION,  OPERATINS  AND  MAITNANCE
Quite quletly  Rank staff  directly  concerned  wlth Irrigation  lending have Increasingly
Identified  an alarming trend  toward  loss  of  control  over  crucial  aspects  of  quality  In Bank
financed  irrlgatlon  projects  at  both  the  stage  of  construction  and the  subsequent  stage
of  operatlons  and maintenance.  Thus,  staff  with technical  functions  now think  of  project
sustainability  largely  In physical  terms.  That  Is, an  Investment  Is not  as  sustainable  as
it should be  because  of  shoddy constructlon  using  Inferlor  n,aterlals  or  because  of  poor
management of  operatlons  and maintenance (0LOW. As two  technical  staff  members wrote
to  us:  "Massive speclal  maintenance budgets  or  rehabilitatlon  only  10  to  15 years  after
constructlon  Is not  the  best  way to  reach  sustainablilty."  Thus,  the  Issue  of  project
sustainabillty  goes  way beyond  the  Issue  of  providing  adequate  funds  for  O&M  as well as
construction.
Bank irrigatlon  staff  In Asia region  have developed  a proposed  pollcy response  to
address  the  emerging problem of  physical  sustainability  that  deserves  repetition  here.  The
suggested  policy  response  Is  Itemized In descending  order  of  priority  as  follows:
(a)  Institutional  arrangements  should  be  In  place  to  m'et  the  various
objectives  of  water  resource  development and  exploitation.  In general,
this  means  an  organizational  framework  with  rules  of  operation  and
staffing  which allow  the  varlous  specialist  functlons  (planning,  design,
constructin,  O&M,  and regulatory)  to be carried  out  by specialized staff.-7-
(b)  For  Operations, this  rec;uires rules  and  procedures  for  serving  all
potential  customers (agricultural, municipal,  and Industrlal).  Such rules
should define priorities  and rights In tknes of  shortage or  excess, and
define how temporary surpluses (during project  constructlon)  would be
allocated and withdrawn  over  tkn.m Within  Irrigation projects,  rules for
allocating water among  farmers, the baslc allocation (water right) of  each
farmer In the "design yearu, the responsibilltles of  the beneficlaries for
specific  Items of  operation or  malntenance  and the penalties for  non-
compliance  should also be established.
(c)  For Maintenance,  this means  an organization wlth funding, equlpment,  and
materials adequate to  malntain facilities  to  their  design standard  of
performance Indefinitely. Provision  of  such resources as are required to
meet this objective should be an explicit requirement In legal agreements.
Cd)  Maintenance  of  accounts reflecting  actual expenditures on OLM,  and the
sources of  funds for  such works (separately identifying revenues from
water charges).
(e)  Establishing  the  basis for  assessing water chargm: for  each class of
water  (baslc  allocation,  Interim surpluses  durlng  construction,  annual
surpluses).
While  the proposed pollcy clearly envisions at  least  a modified fiscal  autonomy
Institutional  framework, with minor changes to  reflect  the absence of  a return  flow of
water  charges that  characterizes  'he  fiscal  dependence model It  can  be  used  as  a
standard for  construction  and O&M  within the fiscal dependence Institutional framework.This would, however,  require explicit agreements  with respect to organization, staffing  and
funding of  Ot& that are not always  part of  the context of  fiscal depene.3nce.  Experlence
of  Irrigatin  staff  has  been  that  where  these  conditions  do  not  obtain,  gross
deterioratlon In project  sustalnability Is ;much  more likely; and this means  when It occurs
that  irrigation  projects  are  converted  from  ostensible  Investments  to  disguised
consumption  subsidies through falkure to  maintain  capital.  It Is clear that  such projects
do  not  constitute  development In any  meanlngful sense.  On the  contrary,  with  the
proposed framework  In place, It can be argued that:  those responsible  for  operating and
maintaining  projects  would be  provided with the  facilities  required;  projects  would be
maintained;  all boneficlarles would  have a clear basis for  planning  their operations wlth the
maxlmum  degree of  assuredness; and the  real  cost  of  providing water  resources  to
various users would be known. It can also be argued that the proposed policy Is utopian
In that  It presupposes a degree of  lender leverage that  the Bank very seldom  enjoys, to
say nothing of  Its neglect of  a hardnosed analysis of  the real Incentives for  actlon that
confront  politicians drafting  legislation or  authorizing budgets directed toward Irrigatlon
as  well as  those  Incentives facing  bureaucrats managing  irrlgation  systems.  Yet  the
primary  Issue remalns. Some  of  the Bank financed Irrigation systems are failing apart, and
what Is going to  be done about It?
IV.  WORLD  BAW FRIGATION  PRICING  POLICY
From the  beginning, Bank policy emphasized  recovery  of  all costs  from project
beneficlaries. This policy was re-affirmed by Operational  Policy  Memorandum  (OPM)  No. 2.61
(March 1971), which  admitted that agricultural projects  were sometimes  an exception, butadded that  *as a minkrnum,  operational and maintenance  (OW) costs  should be recovered
completely." This was the policy In place for the sequence  of  irrigatlon projects  assessed
In  the  latest  Operations Evaluation Department (OED) review  ("World Bank  Lending
Conditionality:  A Revlew  of  Cost Recovery In Irrigatin  Projects",  June 1986), which Is
discussed bow.
However, cost  recovery  policy was significantly changed In  1976 with Central
Projects  Memorandum  (CPU)  No. 8.4, which Inposed detailed Instructions with respect  to
the progressive taxation of  Incremental  project rents.  The pollcy of  CPM  8.4 was slightly
rJvised to provide more flexibility In hplementation  by Central Project Note (CPN)  No. 2.10
In 1980.  This policy statement, which Is now called OPN  2.10, Is operant current  polly.
The policy Instructions of  OPN  2.10 set  forth  three pricing objectives for  design
of  Irrigation service fees:  economic  officlincy,  Income  distribution and public savings.
The Instructlons under each objective will be discussed In turn.
Economic  Efficiency
The Instructlon Is In terms of  "efficiency  prices" , which are not defined, and It
recommends  volumetric pricing (where possible) of  irrigatlon service fees.  Clearly It  Is
Intended that  utillty  maxlmizlng  farmer irrigators  should be given an incentive to  apply
Irrigation  water up  to  the  point  at  which the  value  of  tha  expected utillty  from an
idditlonal unit of  water would be equal to  Its marginal  cost.  If all farmers have the same
expected utillty and the private marginal  cost (i.e., unit  Irrigation servics fee) Is equal to
the marginal social coa.t of  Irrigation water, then  the  marginal  condition  for  economic
efficiency (Pareto optimality) Is met.  However,  only a tiny minority of  Irrigating farmers
In developing countries face volumetric pricing of  water and can obtain additional water
on  demand (even wlthin limits).  All other  farmers recolve  an exogenously determined- 10  -
allocatlon that Yar'es stochastically from period to period (this neglects the fortunate  few
that  have a  tubewell).  Such farners  form  expectations of  how much water  they will
receive  (and when) over  a cropping cycle and allocate the  expected quantity  so  as to
maximize  their expected utlIty.  That Is, they allocate expected dellverles to  given crop
acreages according to  farm specific  shadow  prices.  The Irrigation service fee  (usually
area based) Is perceived as a lump sum tax which Is Irrelevant to  their  water allocation
decision.  The quantity allocatlon to  farmers, Insofar as system design permits choices,
Is  accompllst.  .d  by  the  irrigation  system managers under guidelines from their  political
masters.  There Is no reason why such an allocation cannot be efficlent.  To achieve
efficiency  consistently,  however, requires  appropriate Incentives for  system managers,
detalled Information on the  value of  the marginal  product  of  water across  farm types
and regions, and for  many countries  enabling legislation.  OPN  2.10 does not  consider
these possibilltles, but rather  notes that "other methods  of  assessing charges may also
have to  be  considered to  ensure  an  equitable Income knpact of  the  project  and an
adequate recovery of  project  costs."
Income  Distribution
This Instruction Is seemingly  more precise.  It asserts that taxes (Irrigation service
fees)  to  capture a share of  project  benefits should take Into account the abillty to  pay
of  different  farmers.  That Is, benefit taxes should be progressive although "taking Into
account  disincentives, tax  evasion and problems  of  cost  collection."  The Indicator of
benefits  Is the Incremental  value at  the farm level of  what we have called the irrigation
rent  (net  of  irrigation  service  fees  or  thelr  equivalent).  Farmers below a  critical
consumption  level (CCL)  would not  be taxed, while those above that  level would be taxed
progressively as  Income  Increased above the  critical  level.  Note that  this  Instruction- 11  -
requires  the  calculatlon  of  Income on  a  farm  by  farm  basis,  although  a  proxy  such  as
farm size or  marketed output  might be used, and then assessing  Irrigation  service  charges
under  a  progressive  schedule.  The  Information  requirements  for  Implementation of  this
instruction  are  considerable,  as  are  the  opportunities  for  arbitrary  assessment  by  tax
collectors.  Moreover,  the  Income distributlon  Instruction  Is totally  at  variance  with the
thrust  of  the  economic  efficlency  instruction.
Public Savings
This Instructlon  alms at  Increasing  the  volume of  Investable  resources  In the hands
of  the  government  in preference  to  additional  consumption  by at  least  the  more affluent
citizens.  However, It recognizes  a potential  conflict  with the  Income distributlon  objective
If  many of  the  proJect  beneficiaries  are  poor.  It  Is  noteworthy  for  the  absence  of  any
Instructions  on  project  sustalnability  or  replicabillty.
In  summary, existing  policy  guidelines  provide  little  guidance  In  applying  multiple
criteria  for  pricing  of  Irrigation  service  fees.  In  particular,  the  Income  distribution
Instruction  seems unworkable  and Inconsistent  with the  spirit  of  the  economic efficlency
Instructlon.  The project  analyst  Is left  free  to  develop  his own weights  for  the  several
objectives;  and In that  sense,  anything  goes.  One suspects  that  the  unworkable  Income
distribution  guldelines  have mostly been Ignored.  The spirit  of  OPN 2.10 Is clearly  laissez
faire.  It  recognizes  that  "efficiency  pricing"  may be  In conflict  with the  other  objectives
and suggests  that  other  forms  of  taxation,  such  as  a land tax  or  a betterment  tax might
be  substituted.  Presumably these  taxes  may be  set  at  levels  which do  not  confilct  wlth
other  objectives.  The Instructlon  on  benefit  taxes  also  advises  that  the  effects  of  a
project  on  revenues  from other  taxes  should be taken  Into consideratlon,  I.e., Increments
in  other  revenues  due  to  the  project  should  be  deducted  from  the  Irrigation  rent  on- 12  -
which water charges or benefit taxes may  be levied.  OPN  2.10 goes on to  observe that:
"There Is no prkna face  reason why any particular share of  costs,  such as OLM  costs,
should normally  be recovered."
A further  note on financing operations and maintenance  (OLM)  was Issued by OPS
In  1984.  This note  asked that  assurances be required (at  the  appraisal stage)  that
sufficient  funds would be available for  OWM.  It  also specifled that  there  should be an
analysis of  how the fiscal system affects  farmer Incentives.  Perhaps  most Interestingly,
the 1984 note did not require that OW8  costs  be covered by direct cost  recovery  from
proJect beneficlaries.  It should be noted that none of  these Instructions asked for  an
analysis of  the consistency of  the many  government Interventions In agriculture %Ith the
proposed scheme  for  Irrigation service fees.  In particular, there was no reference to  an
analysis of  direct and Indirect taxation of  agricultural outputs.  Nor was any justification
ever  given for  using irrigation water fees  as a  vehicle for  Income  redistrlbution  when
much more esfficlen' means for  targeting the poor were avallable.
V.  A BREF tEVEW  OF BSA EXPERENCE  WITH
uRIGATIDN  COST  RECOVERY  CONDITODNALITY
This  sectin  summarizes  documented Bank experience and  Is  based on  the
aforementioned  OED  review of  June 1986.  As noted above, the review covers the period
up  to  1976,  when relatively  unambiguous  policy  guldelines were In  place.  The iong
gestation  period  for  kIplementatlon  of  irrlgatlon  projects  and the  lack of  consistent
guidelines  over  the 1976-88 period make It likely that the appearance  of  a snimlar  review
for  that  period Is some years away.
Since  the overall assessment  of Bank experience  given In the summary  of  the 1986- 13 -
OED  review Is clear and concise, It Is repeated here:
'Overall, the  cost  recovery  record  hI irrigation  projects  has  not  been good.
Frequently, the Bank's requirements  as expressed  In lending  covenants, particularly
with respect to recovery of  Investment  costs, have been so vague that compliance
or noncompliance  Is difficult  to  determine. In at least two-thirds  of  the projects
reviewed the covenant requirlng that  cost  recovery satisfy  OWM  funding has not
been complied with.  The proportion  of  OLM costs  recovered  was frequently
between 15 and 45 percent.  In addition, there were very few cases where capital
costs  were recovered."
The OED report  goes  on  to  note  that  OLM of  Irrigation  systems  was  considered
satisfactory  at  audit In only about half of  the projects.  Compliance  with cost  recovery
covenants was assessed as satisfactory  In only 15 percent  of  the  cases.  When  the
pricing  covenants  required  a  soclo-economic  survey  and  It  was  uIplemented,  the
recommendations  were "generally not applied". The response of Bank operations staff  to
noncompliance  wlth cost  recovery covenants has been quite varlable, coverlng the gamut
from refusal to  consider further  financing of  Irrigatlon projects  to  no reaction  at  all.
VL  SOME  REASONS  FOR  NONCOWLIANCE  WIlH
RRIGATION  LENDING  CONDTONALITY
The 1986 OED  review on Irrigation cost  recovery singles out  three major reasons
for  the  record  of  noncompliance  wlth cost  recovery  covenants:  I)  the  often  heavy
burden of  direct  and Indirect taxes already kIposed  on agriculture;  11)  unrellable water
supply due to poor OWM  of  irrigatlon systems; and 1ii)  the lack of  government commitment.
The evidence with respect  to  each reason will be brlefly  assessed In turn.- 14  -
Direct  and  Indirect  Taxes on  Agriculture
The most  comprehensive  and consistent  evidence  on  direct  and  Indirect  taxation
of  agriculture  comes from  the  World Bank comparative  study  of  the  political  economy of
agricultural  pricing  policies  directed  by  Anne 0. Krueger,  Maurice Schiff  & Alberto  Valdes
(hereinafter  KSV).  This study  provides  estimates  from  country-level  research  studied  for
eighteen  deveioping countries.  The Initially published results  focus  on the  Inpact of  direct
and Indirect  policles on  the  prices  of  major export  and Import-competing  commoditles.  For
details  of  the  KSV methodology,  the  reader  Is referred  to  thelr  published  papers.
Table  1 (from  KSV) presents  their  estknates  of  nominal direct,  Indirect  and  total
Intervention  for  representative  export  crops  In sixteen  countries  over  the  perlod  1975-
79  and  1980-84.  The numbers on direct  Intervention  give  an estknate  of  the  percentage
by which domestic  producer  prices  devlated  from the  border  price  (adjusted  for  transport,
storage,  other  costs  and  quallty  differentials)  measured at  the  official  exchange rate.
The  estinates  of  Indirect  effects  make  allowance  for  the  effect  of  trade  and
macroeconomic policies  on  the  real  exchange rate  and the  extent  of  protection  given  to
nonagricultural  commoditles.  The total  effect  Is simply the  sum of  the  direct  and Indirect
Interventions.  For  the  sixteen  countries  and representative  export  crops  listed  In Table
1  the  total  of  direct  and  Indirect  taxation  of  agricultural  exports  averaged  about  40
percent  over  the  1975-84  period.  For most  countries,  there  was significant  taxation  of
exports  at  both  the  direct  and Indirect  levels.  All of  these  countries  are Bank borrowers,
and  many have  borrowed  to  finance  Irrigation  projects--e.g.,  'gypt,  Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Portugal,  Sri  Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.  Clearly,  the  dominant pattern  Is one
of  heavy  taxatlon  of  agricultural  exports,  with  Indirect  taxatlon  via  trade  and  macro-
economic pollcy  accounting  for  about  two-thirds  of  the  total  on  average.- 1S  -
Table  1:  Dlrect,  Indirect,  and Total  Nominal
Protection  Rates  for  Exported  Products
(percent)
1975-79 --  8-  1CaOe4
Country  Product  Direct  Indirect  Total  Direct  Indirect  Total
Argentina  Wheat  .25  -16  -41  -13  -37  -50
Brazil  Soybeans  -8  -32  -40  -19  -14  -33
Chile  Grapes  1  22  23  0  -7  -7
Colombia  Coffee  -7  -25  -32  -5  -34  -39
Cote D'ivoire  Cocoa  -31  -33  -64  -21  -26  -47
Dominican  RepubCoffee  -15  -18  -33  -32  -19  -51
Egypt  Cotton  -36  -18  -54  -22  -14  -36
Ghana  Cocoa  26  -66  -40  34  -89  -55
Malaysia  Rubber  -25  -4  -29  -18  -10  -28
Pakistan  Cotton  -12  -48  -60  -7  -35  -42
Philippines  Copra  -11  -27  -38  -26  -28  -54
Portugal  Tornatoes  17  -5  12  17  -13  4
Sri Lanka  Rubber  -29  -35  -84  -31  -31  -62
Thailand  Rice  -28  -15  -43  -15  -19  -34
Turkey  Tobacco  2  -40  -38  -28  -35  -63
Zambia  Tobacco  1  -42  -41  7  -57  -50
Average  -11  -25  -36  -11  -29  -40
Source:  Krueger,  Schiff,  and Valdes,  1988,  'Agricultural  Incentives  in Developing  Countries,'  World Bank
Economic  Review  2(3):p.262.
Note:  Korea  and Morocco  are not included  because  all main agricultural  products  are are imported.
The direct nominal protection  rate is defined as the dfference between the total and the
indirect  nominal  protection  rates, or equivalently  as the ratio  of (1) the difference  between  the
relative  producer  price and the relative  border price,  and (2)  the relative  adjusted  border price
measured  at the equilibrium  exchange  rate and in the absence  of all trade policies.
Table 2 (from KSV) presents  comparable data  for  representative  kmport-competing
food  crops  in  16 countries.  In contrast  to  the  export  crops,  which were  taxed  at  both
the  direct  and  Indirect  levels  on  average,  the  knport-competing  commodities are  usually
given  significant  direct  protection,  but  then  are  Indirectly  taxed  at  higher rates  so  that
the  total  effect  Is taxatlon  of  import-competing  crops  on  average  by about  five  percent.
However,  If  two  countries  which have  given  exceptional  protection  to  rice--Korea  and
Malaysia--are  excluded, the average  for  total  protectlon  changes to  -15  and -18  percent
for  the  two  periods.  Some countrles  tax  kiport-competing  commoditles at  both  levels,- 16  -
achieving total  protection  of  about  -60  percent  In the  cases  of  Pakistan (wheat)  and
Zambia  (corn).
Tahle  2:  Direct,  Indirect,  and Total  Nominal
Protection  Rates for  Imported Food Products
(percent)
1975-79--
Country  Product  Direct  Indirect  Total  Direct  Indirect  Total
Brazil  Wheat  35  -32  3  -7  -14  -21
Chile  Wheat  11  22  33  9  -7  2
Colombia  Wheat  5  -25  -20  9  -34  -25
Cote d'lvoire  Rice  8  -33  -25  16  -26  -10
Dominican  Repub.  Rice  20  -18  2  26  -19  7
Egypt  Wheat  -19  -18  -37  -21  -14  -35
Ghana  Rice  79  -66  13  118  -89  29
Korea  Rice  91  -18  73  86  -12  74
Malaysia  Rice  38  -4  34  68  -10  58
Morocco  Wheat  -7  -12  -19  0  -8  -8
Pakistan  Wheat  -13  -48  -61  -21  -35  -56
Philippines  Corn  18  -27  -9  26  -28  -2
Portugal  Wheat  15  -5  10  26  -13  13
Sri Lanka  Rice  18  -35  -17  11  -31  20
Turkey  Wheat  28  -40  -12  -3  -35  -38
Zambia  Corn  -13  -42  -55  -9  -57  -66
Average  20  -25  -5  21  -27  -6
Source  Krueger,  Schiff, and Valdes, 1988,  "Agricultural  Incentives  in Developing  Countries,"
World Bank Economic  Review  2(3):p.263.
Note:  Argentina and  Thailand are not  included because their main food products are
exported.
Turkey was a net exporter  of wheat in some years,  and in the Dominican  Republic
rice was not traded in some years.
The Direct  nomninal  protection  rate is defined  as the difference  Detween  the total and
the indirect  nominal  protection  rates, or equivalently  as the ratio of (1) the difference
between  the relative  producer  price and the relative  border price,  and (2) the relative
adjusted  border price measured  at the equilibrium  exchange  rate and in the absence
of all trade policies.
While discrimination  against  agriculture  Is  well  known,  the  KSV results  provlde
quantitative  measures  of  the  degree  of  bias  agalnst  agriculture.  In  the  face  of  such
massive direct  and  indirect  taxation  of  agricultural  commodities, It  Is  not  surprising  that
farmers  resent  additional  taxation.  Nor  is  It  surprlsing  that  many governments  are
reluctant  to  Impose additional taxes  on  farmers.  In fact,  many of  their  direct  agricultural- 17  -
interventions,  e.g., subsidies on irrigatlon water, fort,lizer,  pesticidos and credit,  are In
the  nature  of  second-best  measures designed  to  offset  (at  least  partlally)  the
disincentives to  agricultural output  from macroeconomic,  trade  and agricultural pricing
pollcles.
Unrellable  Water Supply
If  operations and maintenance  are  not  adequate, or  If  the  Irrigatlon system Is
poorly designed,  water supply may  not be dependable. In such circumstances,  farmers are
understandably  reluctant to pay Irrigation service fees, particularly If they are confident
that  system managers  will not  cut  off  their  supply for  nonpayment. Since the design of
Irrigation  systems  In  most  developing countries  prevents  system  operators  from
discriminating  between paying and nonpaying  farmers, the threat  of  loss of  supply seems
remote to many farmers.  Moreover, in most cases, system operators  do not depend on
Irrigation service fees for  finance of  O&M. Thus, while good O&M  may be a  necessary
conditlon for  adequate direct  cost  recovery,  It  Is not  sufficient  since many countries
follow  the  fiscal  dependence model which commingles  irrigation  fees  with  general
government revcnues and finances irrigation O&M  from the general government budget.
Bank policy and practice have often  Implicitly  assumed  that  governments  follow the fiscal
autonomy  model  of  irrigation service provision when  in fact  they do not.  In additlon, as
Wade (1979,  1982) has demonstrated, In some countries  O&M  funds  are used by  the
Irrigation system managers  for private rent collection.  In the light of  these hard realities,
many Irrigation economists now argue that  taxation of  agricultural output  or  a tax  on
agricultural land value are more efficlent  methods  of  cost recovery since farmers are noc
asked to  pay for  Ineffective or unreliable Irrigation services that  fall to  produce a net
gain In  value of  production,  or  equivalently In land values.  Of  course,  taxatlon  of- 18  -
agricultural  commoditles Inevitably  means taxatlon  of  marketed  agricultural  surplus  since
farm  or  village  level  transactions  are  virtually  Impossible to  tax  In the  sense  of  ylelding
positive  net  revenue.
To  the  extent  that  the  conditions  of  the  fiscal  autonomy  model of  Irrlgatlon
service  provision  are  met, the  linkage of  O&M  wlth collection  of  Irrlgation  service  fees  Is
real.  Farmers will  understand  that  thelr  fees  finance  O&M, and  irrigation  managers  will
seek  to  efficlently  collect  service  fees  since  they  finance  their  own  salarles  and
perquisites.  In such  an  Institutional  context,  the  participation  of  farmers  In tertlary  and
quarternary  level O&M  Is more natural,  though not  without  problems of  the  free-rider  sort.
Bank  experience  with  water  user  assoclations  Is  still  quite  limited, and  the  results  are
quite  mixed.  However, given an  Institutional  context  of  fiscal  autonomy,  farmers  will quite
naturally  monitor  the  activitles  of  the  Irrlgatlon  system managers;  and  In such  cases,  It
seems  sensible  to  formalize  the  monitoring  role  by  electing  farmer  representatives  to
boards  of  directors  who oversee  Irrigation  system  management.
Government  Commitment
In the  final  analysis,  unless the  government  of  the  country  Is committed to  a policy
and stands  ready  to  implement It,  the  policy  Is null and  void.  Thus,  any  and  all failures
In compliance with  covenants  to  loan  agreements  can  be  regarded  as  due  to  a  lack  of
government  commitment. Equivalently,  It can  be sald that  such  failure  also  reflects  a lack
of  commitment on  the  part  of  the  lending  Ir.titutlon  when it  asks  for  a  covenant  that
experlence  and  good  Judgement suggest  will not  be  honored  In practice.  Certainly,  the
Bank has  been guilty  of  Insisting  on  cost  recovery  Dolicies  that  clearly  are  Inconsistent
with  the  policies  of  borrowing  government,  especially  when the  implied change  Is  for  a
particular  proJect.  A continuing  dialogue  with such a government,  through  special  studies- 19  -
and  pollcy-based  lending, may be  a  more officacious  approach to  sustainabilty  and
replicabillty of  infrastructure  Investments  than covenants Inserted In ban agreements  on
a project  by project  basis.  A case In point Is the government  of  India which has stated
In writing more than once that Its pollcy Is dlfferent and that It does not expect irrigation
projects  to generate revenues or recover costs to ensure sustalnablllty after  completion.
VL  A FRAMEWORK  FOR DESIGN  OF SUSTAALE
RIIGATION  *VSTENTS
The previous discusslon, by revlewing  the Bank's experlence with conditlonality on
Irrigation  project  lending and  considering the  major  reasons  for  noncompilance  with
Irrigation lending  covenants, has highlighted  the growing  dissatisfactlon with past practice.
In particular, the record of  substantlal noncompliance  with covenants requiring adequate
funding of  operatlons  and maintenance  kIpiles  there  exists  a  real  hazard of  physical
nonsustaInability  of  Irrigation Investments. It remains  'o  synthesize the hard lessons from
experience Into  a better  framework for  Irrlgation lei, 'ing.  We  belleve that  the  lessons
from experience and straightforward application of  economic  understanding can be bolled
down to  a  set  of  propositlons that  do  Indeed comprise the  better  framework that  Is
needed.  These propositions are presented and discussed In sequence.
1.  Accept the  diversity  of  cultures  and Institutional  arrangements In  borrowing
countries and substitute  flexibility and Ingenulty In place of  rigidity In deslgning  feasible
irrigation  Institutions  sufficiently  robust  to  meet  the  demanding operatlonal  and
malntenance  requirements of  contemporary Irrigation.  In the  past,  zeal for  the  fiscal
autonomy model has led the  Bank to  Insist  on cost  recovery  covenants that  are not
acceptable to  some  borrowing countries.  This Is not to  deny the evident virtues of  the- 20  -
fiscal  autonomy  model  of  Irrigation finance, but sknply  to  recognize that  some countries
have objections  to  It  that  are deepseated.  In general, countrlos  that  find  the  fiecal
dependence model of  Irrigatlon finance more acceptable, Ie.,  virtually all former British
colonies, will have some problems  with the  fiscal  autonomy  model.  Moreover, they  are
correct  In their concerns for  the rnarrow  focus of  the fiscal autonomy  model. It does not
take Into account other government Interventions that  Inpact on farmers.
The  fIscal  autonomy model Is  optknal for  a  first-best  world  In  which other
Interventions  by  government are  neutral  with  respect  to  resource  allocation  and
distributlonal policy Is handled by lump-sum  taxes.  However,  Its single-minded  application
to  a  second-best  world offers  no  assurance that  such application would lead to  an
knr-ovement In either efficlency or equity.  Of course, where  fiscal autonomy  Is acceptable
to  the  borrower,  design of  project  sustainability should recognize  and bulid on  the
opportunity  for  greater  autonomy and professlonalism  In Irrigation system management.
Second-best Issues can be accommodated  within the Institutional  context  of  the fiscal
autonomy  model.
2.  Focus the  dialogue concerning Irrigation upon  the  physlcal  sustainabillty of
Irrigation Investments  and the associated natural  resources.  We  have seen that irrigatlon
staff  have  Identifled  a  growing trend  toward  loss  of  quality  control  In  both  the
construction  and  O&M stages  of  Irrigation  systems  that  threatens  the  physlcal
sustainability  of  irrigation  Investments.  Unlike the  discussion of  finance  and  cost
recovery  In irrigatlon which needs to  be approached at  the sectoral  and fiscal  levels,
physlcal sustalnability  Is  most naturally  discussed at  the  project  level.  Here It  Is
kIportant  to  distinguish between the  finance  of  and  the  knplementation  of  irrigation
Investments.  Technical irrigation staff  assign significant emphasis  to  decisions during- 21 -
planning, design and construction  as  major determhants of  project  sustalnabilty.  It
should be noted that  these activities occur during the porlod of  active Bank Involvemont,
Ie.,  the stages of  appraisal and project  supervision.  For this reason, some may argue
that  existing policy properly  Interpreted Is  sufficient  to  deal with problems of  quality
control.  On the other hand, the comments  and p,oposed policy changes by Asia technical
staff  (in section 111)  Imply  that existing practice has been Inadequate; and a need exists
for  detalled policy Instructions that  prescribe a sec?uence  of  steps  designed to correct
the  problem.  It  Is  probably premature to  take  that  step, but  the  evidence from Asia
(where most of  Bank Irrigation lending has been centered)  Is highly cautionary.  More
active  Bank Involvement at  the  planning, design and  construction  stages  Is  clearly
Indicated.  In  particular,  active  testing  of  construction  quality  shold  be  Initiated.
Supervision of  public construction  has always been a problem In both  deveioped and
deveioping countries  since  the  responsible officials  and  the  contractor  agents  are
exposed to  moral hazard In the absence of  active monitoring.
Unlike the earlier phases that end with constructlon,  operations and maintenance
commence  after  the  period of  active  Bank Involvement. Yet  adequate funding of  OW8
though Important Is only one component  of  an "OWM  Plan"  that technical staff  Insist should
be In place at  the time of  appralsal.  This stop forces the borrower to  Identify financlal
requirements  for  O&M  early In the project  cycle and opens the door for  Influential Inputs
from Bank appraisal teams In talioring the level of  effort  to  what Is reasonably required.
Once  Bank staff  close a project,  any further  Impact depends  on monitoring of  borrower
performance wlth respect  to  loan covenants.  The existence of  a  detailed O&M  plan
greatly facilitates  monitoring of  compliance  and removes ambiguities  that  may cioud the
Issue.  Disregard  of  an O&M  covenant should set off  an alarm  requiring a strong response- 22  -
by the Bank.  Continued noncompliance  would require cossation of  all Irrigatlon lending  If
the Bank Is to  retain credibillty w!'h respect to  Its  Irrigatlon portfolio.  While  very rarely
circumstances might exist which  would justify  an exception to  this rule,  the open-ended
application of  an exceptions clause would render the rule useless.  A vlable compromise
would requiro that  all exceptions be approved by  senior management  In the operatlons
committee.
Quite clearly, sustalnabillty as  applied to  Irrigation projects  must be Interpreted
broadly to  Include  the environment  as well as physical irrigation Investments  (with the sole
exception of  nonrenewable  groundwater resources).  It makes  little  sense to  Insure that
Investments  In physical structures  are sustained and then neglect onvironmental  knpacts
which affect  the  economic productivity  of  the  Investments or  the  productivity  of  the
natural  onvironment within which the  Investments are  embedded. For  a  discusslon of
sustalnability as applied to  irrigatlon, see OMara (1988).
The environmental  Issue that Is typIcally encountered In surface irrigatlon projects
Is that of  waterlogging  and sallnization  due to  Inadequate  dralnage. Project planning  and
specification should make  provision for adequate drainage In all projects.  This does not
mean that  drainage Investments need to  be constructed  prior  to  i  realized need, but
rather  that  a foreseeable future  drainage requirement should be treated  as Integral to
the project.  That Is, discounted costs  and benefits due to  future  drainage Investments
should be  Included In the calculation of  the overall  project  rate  of  return.  However,
drainage Investment costs  would not be Included  In the project  loan.  Rather, they would
be treated  as a necessary future  time silce Investment.
3.  Approach tha finance of  Irrigation operations, maintenance  and  replacement  as
a policy adjustment Issue rather than an Issue of  project  design.  Most of  the Irrigation- 23 -
projects  financed In countries with major Irrigation Infrastructure,  I.e., most of  the Bank-
fInanced Irrigation projects,  are ultimataly managed  by  large, existing bureaucracles for
which the additlonal capacity from the project  Is small In relation to  the  total  capacity
managed. They are most uniikely to  change existing practices sknply  to  accommodate  a
small  Increment to  total  capacity.  If  they do seem to  accept a covenant In a  project
lending  document  that would  appear to  require such change, the result may  simply  be that
some  other canals of  the system will temporarily  recolve less OW8  funding.  It Is not clear
that  anything has been galned by  the transfer  of  funds Induced by such a project  loan
covenant.  On the other hand, conditionality attached to  policy-based lending could and
should apply to  the entire  system.  Such considerations apply with particular force  to
countries that operate according to the fiscal dependence  model  since there Is no linkage
between direct  cost  racovery  and financing of  O&M. Even In countrles  that  operate
according to  a modified fiscal autonomy  model, the setting  of  Irrigation service fees will
ahost  always  Involve some  element  of  subsidy.  The level of this subsidy should take Into
account  other  govornment Interventions, and It  Is therefore  more easily handled as a
pollcy adjustment Issue.
4.  Base policy on an analysis of  the totality of  government Interventions.  The  basic
problem with  a  second-best  world  Is  that  there  Is  no  assurance that  any  sincle
Intervention will provide an Improvement  in either efficlency or  equity without conducting
an analysis of  the impact  of  all government  Interventlons.  This Is a daunting requirement
and causes analysts to  seek approximate  answers which  require less Information and lead
to  a more transparent  analysis.  However,  the choice of  the right  approximation  and Its
Interpretatlon for  policy Durposes Is skill Intensive.  In this sense, the proposed policy
guideline remalns  essentially true.  In one way or another, the analyst must take account- 24  -
of  the totality  of  government  Interventlon In assessing the Impact  on a given sector  or
group of  people.  The previous discussion of  the  Indirect  Inpact  on  agriculture  of
macroeconomic  and trade policy as quantified by  Krueger, Schiff and Valdes has shown
that  anything less  will be  Inadequate.  This does not  mean that  agricultural, natural
resource and Irrigat!on economists  concerned with irrigation lending must be retrained to
acquire macroeconomic  skills.  It does mean  that the macroeconomists  working on country
pollcy problems  must be part of  the team  reviewing  both project  and policy lending  related
to  irrigation; and that  on occasion It will be necessary to  bring In consultants with the
specialized skills needed to  assess overall policy Impacts.  As a  first  approxhnation,  It
would  seem desirable  that  country  macroeconomists  use  the  Krueger-Schiff-Valdes
methodology  to determine  Indirect commodlty-specific  Impacts  of  macroeconomic  and trade
policy.
5.  Assign tax policy Instruments  only to appropriate policy  objectives.  The need for
this proposition should be evident from the problems  generated by the failure of  efforts
to  overioad Irrigation service fees wlth multiple  objectives.  As Tinbergen demonstrated
decades ago, only one policy target can be assigned to a pollcy Instrument If unequivocal
results  are  to  be  obtained.  Glven the  multipilcity of  government Interventions  In all
countries, the problem  Is not  a lack of  Instruments  but  their appropriate assignment  and
the determination  of  Instrument levels that  best achieve overall welfare.  Of course, the
decisions that  tradeoff  galns and iosses for  various pollcy objectives  are set, at  the
highest political level, and these are typically resolved through the budgetary process.
Budget requests from various elements  of government  are assessed by budgeting offices
or  treasuries,  and revised allocations are returned In a multi-stage, Iterative process.
When  playing a role In the budgetary game,  no finance minister or budget office  director- 25  -
with his wits about  him Is going to  look on Irrigation service fees  as an Instrument of
achieving Income  distributional objectives.  In the first  place, farmers receiving Irrigatlon
services are not the poorest of  the poor.  These  are landless laborers and rainfed small
farmers.  Secondly, to  attempt  to  collect  a  tax  by  discrkninating between irrigation
recipients  on  the  basis of  Income Is  unworkable.  There are  better  Instruments for
achieving Income  distributional targets.
At  first  glance, It  Is not  clear whether economic  efficiency  or  cost  recovery  Is
the proper assignment  of  Irrigatlon service fees.  However,  when  Irrigatlon services are
not  priced volumetrically and available to  Irrigators  on demand,  then irrigation fees  are
properly perceived as lump-sum  taxes.  Since  these restrictive  conditions obtain for  only
a  tiny  minority of  irrlgators  In developing countries,  for  the  vast  majority of  farmers
irrigation fees are Irrelevant to  their water allocation decisions.  They do the best they
can with the amount of  water they expect to  get from the Irrigatlon system by asslgning
a personal scarcity price to  water and allocating what they expect to  got  on thelr land
Irn  such a way as to maximize  their private welfare.  Thus, we are left  with cost  recovery
to achieve resource and project sustainability as the approprlate assignment  of  Irrigation
service fees (except where water Is priced volumetrically  and available  on demand). Some
analysts have argued that the transfer  of  large irrigatlon rents Induces  a political demand
for  Irrigation  services  that  results  In  excessive Investment In Irrigation (cf.  Newbery
(1987)).  However, this  Is  not  an  argument over  the  marginal conditions  for  Pareto
efficiency, but rather Is concerned  with the political econwmy  of  large Irrigation subsidies.
The optknal setting  of  Irrigation service  fees  for  cost  recovery  should certainly  be
sufficient  to  avold excessive polltical demand  for  Irrigation subsidies.- 26  -
6.  Accept Indirect cost  recovery as valid where It exists, but Insist  on a rigorous
accounting of  the  equity  Issues of  irrigatlon  rent  transfer.  Funds are  fungible.  If
government Is  recovering  costs  Indirectly,  this  Is  sufficient  In  principle to  assure
sustainability.  However, the  equlty  Issues need to  be  confronted.  These can  be
discussed In terms of  tradeoffs  of  distrlbutlonal benefits between three pairs of  groups:
(I)  farmers vs. nonfarmers, (11)  ralnfed  vs. Irrigated  farmers and (111)  poorer vs.  richer
Irrigated farmers.  The farmers vs. nonfarmers  tradeoff  occurs via Indirect cost recovery.
Where  significant Indirect cost recovery exists, farmers are being taxed In preference to
taxing nonfarmers; and the case for  further  taxation of  farmers Is  very weak.  Rather
nonfarmers should be asked to  assume  muire  of  the tax burden.  If rainfed  farmers are
carrying a significant part of  the Incidence  of  Indirect taxatlon, then a strong case exists
for  direct  taxation of  Irrigated farmers via Irrigatlon service frees  In order  to  recover
the costs  of  irrigation,  In additlon, a reduction of  the  Indirect tax  burden on rainfed
farmers Is recommended  since Irrigation costs  can be recovered directly  from Irrigated
farmers and ralnfed farmers should not be taxed when  the benefits go to others.  Note,
however,  that rainfed farmers are burdened  by the Incidence  of  Indirect taxes only to the
extent  that  they  purchase non-labor  Inputs and  market Indirectly  taxed  agricultural
outputs.  Finally,  as we have seen, the attempt to discrkiinate between richer and poorer
Irrigated farmers vla differential Irrigation service fees uses the wrong tax Instrument  and
Is to  be avoided.  in additlon, to  the extent  that  Irrigation Investments result  In lower
prices for nontradeable  foods. the Irrigation benefit Is transferred  to consumers  of  these
goods.
Clearly, the  equity  Issues of  Irrigation rent  transfers  require  analysis of  the
distributional effects  of  government interventions on both the demand  and supply sides.- 27  -
This can be  done, but  It  requires  skilled  analysts  and usually some data  collection.
General  principles and some  applications to  agriculture are discussed In the volume  edited
by Newbory  and Stern (1987), especially Chapter 13 (by Newbery)  and Chapter 16 (by Sah
and Stigiitz).
To deal with countries,  such as  india, which reject  direct  Irrigation service fees
and clakm  that  Irrigation rerit  transfers  are part of  a distrlbutlonal policy, would seem  to
require a complex  analysis of  distributional effects.  Moreover, the results  might Indicate
the need for  extensive tax adjustments.  For less refractory  borrowers who accept the
prlnciple of  Irrigation service fees,  a less complex  analysis should be adequate In many
cases.  In general, one would expect that  significant  Irrigation service  fees  would be
Indicated.  If direct cost recovery Is to be meaningful,  these fees must be Indexed,  elther
to  an Index of  orices  received by farmers or  to  a cost  of  living Index.  The analytical
work required to  confront  the  equity Issues of  irrigation rent  transfer  Is best carried
out  In connection wlth pollcy-based lending.  Repetition  of  this speclalized  work for  each
irrigatlon project  would be unnecessary and wasteful.
VIIL SUIMARY
Up to  1976,  Bank policy  emphasized  recovery  of  all costs,  or  at  a  minkium
complete  recovery of  operations and malntenance  costs.  Subsequently,  policy specified
three pricing objectives for  design of Irrigation service fees: economic  efficiency,  Income
distribution and public savings.  The economic  efficiency objective was framed  In Irrelevant
terms, while the quite detailed Income  distribution objective Instructions were unworkabla.
This  leaves the  public  savings  objective  for  which there  were  not  any  clear-cut,- 28  -
unambiguous instructions.  Thus, for  the  past  12 years,  effective  formal policy  guidelines
for  irrigation  cost  recovery  have been nonexistent.  Of course,  Bank lending for  irrigation
has  been active  over  the  1976-88  perlod,  which leaves  the  clear  Inference  that  Informal
rules  of  thumb for  designing  cost  recovery  covenants  have  existed.  Unfortunately,  an
OED  review  of  loan  conditionality  concerning  Irrigatlon  cost  recovery  for  this  period  has
not  yet  been produced.  However, the  1986 OED  review of  this  topic  covering  the  perlod
up  to  1976  disciosed  that  the  record  was  not  good  In that  earlier  period.  In at  least
two-thirds  of  the  projects  reviewed,  the  covenant  requiring  that  cost  recovery  at  least
cover  O&M  costs  had not  been  compiled wlth.  In many cases,  the  covenants  concerning
cost  recovery  were  so  vague  that  It  was difficult  to  determine whether  there  had been
compliance or  not.  O&M  of  the  Irrlgation  systems  concerned  was considered  satisfactory
at  audit  In only  about  half  of  the  projects.
Given  the  demonstrated  Inadequacy  of  existing  guidelines  concerning  Irrigation
finance  aind  the  growing  concern  with  quality  control  on  Bank-financed  Irrigation
Investments,  a synthesis  of  the  hard  lessons  from  Bank lending experience  into  a better
framework  for  irrigatlon  lending  Is  needed.  This  paper  suggests  that  six  basic
propositions  distilled  from  Bank experience  can  serve  as the  basis for  such a framework:
I.  Accept  the  diversity  of  cultures  and  institutional  arrangements  In
borrowing  countries  and substitute  flexibility  and Ingenulty  In designing
feasible  irrlgation  Institutlons.
li.  Focus  tNix  dlalogue  upon  the  physlcal  sustalnability  of  irrigation
Investmer.a  and associated  natural  resources.
Ill.  Approach  the  finance  of  Irrigation  as  a policy  adjustment  Issue.
Iv.  Base cost  recovery  pollcy on an analysis of  the  totality  of  government
Interventions.
v.  Assign  tax  policy  Instruments  to  appropriate  policy  objectives.- 29 -
vI.  Accept  Indirect  cost  recovery  whore It  exists,  but  insist  on  an
accounting of  tho oquity Issues of  irrigation rent  transfer.
These propositions yleld a number  of  knplcatlons  for  irrigatlon lending that should
kmprove existing  practice.  The first  two  knply that  the  Bank would be  more flexible
concerning institutional preferences but would Insist more strongly on arrangements  that
preserve the  sustainability of  Irrigation Investments  and associated natural  rosources.
A key feature of  the emphasis  on sustainabillty requires the development  of an "OLM  Plan"
with the borrower at  the tkne of  appraisal.  This plan would go beyond the provision of
adequate O&M  funding to  specify the level of  effort  required to  sustain the Investment.
Covenants requiring compliance  with the O&M  Plan would be part of  ioan agreements and
their vilation  would Initiate a mandatory  Bank response.  Repeated  violatlon would usually
end In cessation of  Irrigation lending.
The third  and fourth  propositions address Issues of  Irrigation finance and cost
recovery.  The clear lesson from the Kruoger-Schlff-Valdes study  Is that most countries
prefer  to  kmpose direct  and Indirect  taxes  on  agricultural  commodity  outputs.  This
taxatlon  Is usually massive  and further  taxes on farmers can only be hkposed  on cost
recovery  or  equity  grounds.  Often  additional taxatin  will not  be  justified.  This
determination requires, however, a thorough-golng economic  analysis that  goes beyond
direct  taxation.  Repilcation  of  the  KSV  methodology (where necessary) would seem to
be an obvious first  step In such an analysis.  An obvlous corollary of  the KSV study Is
that  irrigation finance Is most appropriately addressed as a policy adjustment Issue.
The last two propositions deal specifically with Issues of  officlency and equity that
arise In connection with the analysis of  irrigation service fees.  They are compiemontary
to  the third  and fourth  propositions In that  they are concerned with the Issues of  tax- 30 -
efficiency  and equity that  emerge  in Irrigation cost  recovery.  In particular, It  Is urged
that  the analysis take  Into account the welfare effects  on the major groups that  are
Involved; and the  appropriate objective  for  irrigation service  fees  Jjn the  absence of
equlty Issues) Is the pubilc savings or  cost  recovery objective.
VIIL  EPLOGUE
This paper Is a modest effort  to  clear away the confusion surrounding irrigatlon
policy both Inside and outside of  the Bank.  That there Is a need for  a policy dlalogue
within the institutin  on this topic Is Increasingly  apparent.  In Its present form, the paper
reflects  the comments  and criticism  of  many  Bank staff  concerned wlth Irrigation; and while
some  of  them  may not yet find It entirely to thelr liking, It has significantly benefited from
their Inputs. Certainly, this paper represents the first  and not the last shot In the latest
controversy over irrlgation policy within the Bank. Also, lest we forget,  the outside world
Is also observing and commenting  on our actions.  Thus, Stelnberg (1983) observed In an
USAID  conference volume:  "It  Is  significant that  to  date  the World Bank has no policy
paper on Irrigation, as there are Internal disputes on such matters as water-user  fees
and technological Issues such as the llning of  canals."- 31  -
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